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OUR PROUDEST BOAST 
Wyatt Kozinski* 
It took eighty-eight years to return to an old but proud principle of free speech law, 
one that was first announced in a little remembered dissent by Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes. That principle recently found noteworthy expression in Justice Samuel Alito’s 
opinion in Matal v. Tam (2017). For it was in that case that the Court harkened back to 
Justice Holmes’s dissent in United States v. Schwimmer (1929). This was Holmes’s last 
free speech opinion. Notably, it was not a constitutional case, but rather a case involving 
an immigrant. Yet Holmes took the occasion to announce a broad new principle that 
would, in time, blossom into a major tenet of our free speech jurisprudence – the need to 
protect the speech we hate. According to Holmes, this principle is not limited to citizens 
but applies to all those living in the United States. Holmes managed to do all this in 634 
scant words. There is evidence that Brandeis played a role in spurring Holmes to write 
this dissent. But the circumstances of Holmes’s life—the loss of his wife, the realization 
that his long career and life were coming to an end—also helped shape an opinion that is 
the antithesis of the values Holmes championed as a Justice: judicial restraint, a value-
neutral jurisprudence, and personal detachment from the facts of his cases and the people 
whose lives they affected. Schwimmer was the one case where Holmes showed a touch of 
humanity that was otherwise absent from his judicial work. The Supreme Court eventually 
adopted Holmes’s Schwimmer dissent in Girouard v. United States (1946). But there is 
much more, namely, the evolution of an idea, magnificently expressed, that nine decades 
later is hailed by the Supreme Court as “the proudest boast of our free speech 
jurisprudence.” 
INTRODUCTION 
Near the end of the last Term, the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in what is 
destined to become a landmark case, Matal v. Tam.1 In sustaining a First Amendment 
challenge to the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act, the majority, per Justice Samuel 
Alito, reaffirmed a core principle of First Amendment law: 
But no matter how the point is phrased, [the Petitioner’s] unmistakable thrust is 
this: The Government has an interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that 
offend. And, as we have explained, that idea strikes at the heart of the First 
                                                          
      *   This Essay benefitted greatly from the advice of Professor G. Edward White of the University of Virginia 
Law School and Professor Ronald K. L. Collins of the University of Washington Law School. 
 1. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
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Amendment. Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, 
age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our 
free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express “the thought 
that we hate.” United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting).2 
What is especially noteworthy about this principle – protecting the thought that we hate – 
is that Holmes announced it in a dissent that was not among his more famous ones.3 For 
that matter, it was not even a First Amendment case. Penned when he was eighty-eight 
and fading, Holmes had little reason to believe that his Schwimmer dissent would ever 
draw more than scant attention compared to his memorable First Amendment opinions. 
But in Schwimmer, as in those cases, Holmes knew how to capture an idea and then encase 
it in rhetoric that would stand the test of time. The principle undergirding that dissent 
would, to paraphrase Justice Alito, become our proudest boast. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes is a towering figure in American law—deified by some,4 
reviled by others,5 and the subject of a large body of scholarly work that is positive but 
not uncritical.6 Despite such widespread exploration, Holmes’s views on many subjects 
have remained opaque, due in large part to “[t]he capacity of his thought to contain diverse 
and self-opposing points of view, the elusiveness of his ideas, [and] the hints in his 
personal life that his temperament was layered and complicated . . . .”7 In a field rich with 
scholarly thought, this Essay sets out to shed some light on Justice Holmes’s last opinion 
dealing with free speech, namely his dissent in United States v. Schwimmer,8 and how that 
                                                          
 2. Id. at 1764 (emphasis added). 
 3. Anthony Lewis did, however, title a book after it. See ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT 
THAT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2007). 
 4. Benjamin Cardozo, who succeeded Holmes as Supreme Court Justice, called him “the great overlord of 
the law and its philosophy.” Benjamin N. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 682, 691 (1931). 
According to Cardozo, Holmes “is today for all students . . . of human society the philosopher and the seer, the 
greatest of our age in the domain of jurisprudence . . . .” Id. at 684. Cardozo’s successor, Felix Frankfurter, did 
him one better: “He is, indeed, philosopher become king.” FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 8 (1927). Eight years later, Frankfurter added that “For centuries . . . men who never heard of 
him will be moving to the measure of his thought.” Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 
1279, 1280 (1935). Two decades later, U.S. District Judge Charles Wyzanski rhapsodized Holmes as being “like 
the Winged Victory of Samothrace . . . the summit of hundreds of years of civilization . . . .” Charles E. 
Wyzanski, Jr., The Democracy of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 7 VAND. L. REV. 311, 323 (1954). Four decades 
later still, Judge Posner described Holmes as “the most illustrious figure in the history of American Law.” Richard 
A. Posner, Introduction to THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL 
OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., at ix (Richard A. Posner ed.,1992). To be 
sure, much more could be added. 
 5. See, e.g., ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE 
HOLMES (2000). Professor Alschuler lists a number of largely forgotten Holmes skeptics, such as Mortimer 
Adler, H. L. Mencken, Yosal Rogat, Saul Touster, and Edmund Wilson. Id. at 10 & nn.62–67. 
 6. See, e.g., SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1989); 
LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1991); G. 
EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF (1993) [hereinafter WHITE, 
LAW AND THE INNER SELF]. See also the large body of work listed by Professor Alschuler in LAW WITHOUT 
VALUES, supra note 5, at 200–02 & n.61. 
 7. WHITE, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, supra note 6, at 4. As Professor White observes, “the ubiquity of 
Holmes’ language and his capacity to take on multiple symbolic roles . . . appear to ensure that his ‘core’ is 
unlikely to come to rest, as successive waves of observers reconfigure his image in accordance with their own 
presuppositions.” Id. 
 8. 279 U.S. 644 (1929). Later, in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), Holmes joined the majority in 
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opinion, nearly nine decades later, shaped our modern free speech jurisprudence. 
SCHWIMMER: A FREE SPEECH CASE THAT WAS NOT A FIRST AMENDMENT CASE 
Schwimmer was not a First Amendment case, or a constitutional case of any sort. 
This is because Rosika Schwimmer was not a U.S. citizen; she was a Hungarian national. 
She had been living in the United States for some years and decided to abandon her 
Hungarian citizenship9 and apply for U.S. citizenship. Her loyalty to the United States and 
its form of government was not in doubt. She was otherwise qualified for citizenship but 
for her refusal to answer in the affirmative the following question: “If necessary, are you 
willing to take up arms in defense of this country?”10 To that question, she answered: “I 
would not take up arms personally.”11 A self-proclaimed “uncompromising pacifist,”12 
Schwimmer explained that she 
found the United States nearest her ideals of a democratic republic, and that she 
could whole-heartedly take the oath of allegiance. . . . For the fulfillment of the duty 
to support and defend the Constitution and laws, she had in mind other ways and 
means. She referred to her interest in civic life, to her wide reading and attendance 
at lectures and meetings, mentioned her knowledge of foreign languages, . . . and 
she would conceive it her duty to uphold [the American form of government against 
attacks in foreign-language publications].13 
The district court denied Schwimmer’s application but the Seventh Circuit reversed, 
reasoning quite sensibly that a fifty-year-old woman would never be called upon to serve 
in the armed forces, so her unwillingness to do so was immaterial to her suitability for 
citizenship.14 
After Olive Rabe15 argued on behalf of Rosika Schwimmer, the Supreme Court 
reversed the Seventh Circuit. Justice Pierce Butler authored the majority opinion, writing 
for himself and five other Justices. According to the majority, Schwimmer had failed to 
show 
that her pacifism and lack of nationalistic sense did not oppose the principle that it 
is a duty of citizenship by force of arms when necessary to defend the country 
against all enemies, and that her opinions and beliefs would not prevent or impair 
                                                          
upholding a First Amendment free speech claim. 
 9. Letter from Rosika Schwimmer to Oliver Wendell Holmes 2 (Jan. 28, 1930), available at 
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:37509894$1i (“A person born into the wrong family—and 
choosing another wrong one when chance permits the selection of a new family—that seemed to be my foolish 
position.”). Schwimmer is here using “family” as a synecdoche for “country” or “nation.” 
 10. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 647 (“The Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, requires: ‘He (the applicant for 
naturalization) shall, before he is admitted to citizenship, declare on oath in open court . . . that he will support 
and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear 
true faith and allegiance to the same.’”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 648. 
 13. Id. at 647. 
 14. Schwimmer v. United States, 27 F.2d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 1928). 
 15. See Ronald K. L. Collins & David L. Hudson Jr., Remembering Two Forgotten Women in Free Speech 
History, First Amend. Ctr. (May 27, 2008), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/remembering-2-forgotten-
women-in-free-speech-history; Jane Dall Wilson, Looking Back . . . The Advocacy of Olive Rabe in Schwimmer 
v. United States, CIRCUIT RIDER, April 2013, at 38. 
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the true faith and allegiance required by the act.16 
That Schwimmer was too old and the wrong sex under the then-applicable conscription 
law was of no consequence to the majority because “the word [pacifism] is also used and 
understood to mean one who refuses [to take up arms] . . . and who is disposed to 
encourage others in such refusal.”17 
As the majority viewed it, “her testimony clearly suggests that she is disposed to 
exert her power to influence others to such opposition.”18 In other words, the majority 
suggested that Schwimmer might encourage others to resist the draft, making a tacit 
allusion to Schenck v. United States,19 in which Holmes, writing for the Court a decade 
earlier, affirmed the conviction of a World War I draft protester—an opinion that Holmes’s 
Schwimmer dissent is at pains to distinguish. In essence, the majority was saying that 
American pacifists caused trouble by persuading conscripted soldiers not to report for duty 
during the Great War, so there was good reason to avoid swelling their numbers by 
granting citizenship—and its concomitant constitutional rights—to someone who might 
engage in similarly subversive activities in case of another war. Given that World War II 
would erupt a scant decade later, and interwar Europe was far from politically stable, the 
majority’s concerns hardly seemed fanciful. 
Holmes’s answer to the majority begins weakly: 
Of course the fear is that if a war came the applicant would exert activities such as 
were dealt with in Schenck v. United States . . . . But that seems to me unfounded. 
Her position and motives are wholly different from those of [Charles] Schenck. She 
is an optimist and states in strong and, I do not doubt, sincere words her belief that 
war will disappear and that the impending destiny of mankind is to unite in peaceful 
leagues.20 
Phrased differently, Holmes rejects the district court’s finding that Schwimmer posed the 
same risk as Schenck in case of war. Given Holmes’s track record of giving great—almost 
blind—deference to the findings of the trier of fact,21 this ex cathedra pronouncement 
about Schwimmer’s motives and likely future conduct is a remarkable departure. 
These statements are best read as a rhetorical springboard for Holmes’s broader 
objection to the Government’s effort to penalize Schwimmer for mere opinion 
unconnected to concrete action, and he does so in resounding terms that only he among 
the Justices could muster: 
Some of her answers might excite popular prejudice, but if there is any principle of 
the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the 
principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom 
for the thought that we hate. I think that we should adhere to that principle with 
                                                          
 16. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 653. 
 17. Id. at 652 (emphasis added). 
 18. Id. 
 19. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (affirming defendant’s conviction for distributing leaflets criticizing conscription 
during World War I and holding that the Espionage Act of 1917 did not violate the First Amendment). 
 20. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 654. 
 21. See discussion infra 531–32. 
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regard to admission into, as well as to life within this country.22 
Here Holmes takes a giant leap by introducing three ground-breaking concepts. The 
first is that the Constitution has anything at all to say about the treatment of aliens—a view 
he had in the past rejected most vigorously.23 Second is the assertion that the Constitution 
guarantees freedom of thought—a right nowhere mentioned. This, too, seems to contradict 
decades of Holmesian jurisprudence—slavishly deferential to majoritarian will24 and 
highly suspicious of efforts to find rights not enumerated in the Constitution. Holmes may 
have thought of himself as what we might today call a strict constructionist, perhaps even 
an originalist—although he would surely have bristled at any such labels.25 Finally, and 
perhaps most remarkable, Holmes announces what might best be described as a meta-
constitutional rule—a rule “that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other”26 
in the Constitution. Was this just rhetorical flourish, or did Holmes mean to say that the 
Constitution embodies a hierarchy of values, some more important than others? For a 
Justice who had for decades derided the value of values,27 this would be a major departure 
indeed. 
The balance of this Essay will consider what may have prompted Holmes to write 
these brief but powerful sentences, and what he may have sought to accomplish with them. 
But in order to do so, it is necessary to have some understanding of Holmes’s pre-
Schwimmer jurisprudence. The next section gives an overview of this, with particular 
emphasis on his somewhat mixed record in First Amendment cases. 
THE YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS28 
During his long life, Holmes served half a century as a Justice—two decades on the 
                                                          
 22. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 654–55. 
 23. Professor Collins notes that “[i]n the past Holmes had been remarkably deferential to the power of the 
United States to treat aliens as lacking constitutional rights.” THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES: A FREE SPEECH 
CHRONICLE AND READER 340 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 2010) [hereinafter THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES]. 
Writing for the Court in Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 556–57 (1913), Holmes stated: “It is admitted that 
sovereign states have inherent power to deport aliens, and seemingly that Congress is not deprived of this power 
by the Constitution of the United States.” 
 24. This attitude is perhaps best summarized in Holmes’s own words: “[I]f my fellow citizens want to go to 
Hell I will help them. It’s my job.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1 
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 249 (Mark 
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) [hereinafter HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS]. 
 25. In a letter to Laski, commenting on Schwimmer’s pacifism, Holmes commented, “All ‘isms seem to me 
silly . . . .” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Apr. 13, 1929), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, 
supra note 24, at 1146. 
 26. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 655. 
 27. Professor Alschuler wrote an entire book criticizing Holmes for his disdain for values. See ALSCHULER, 
supra note 5. Holmes seems to have had values when he was a young man, enlisting in the army during the Civil 
War because of his strong abolitionist beliefs. THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 23, at 4–5. Seeing the 
ravages of war, and being wounded three times, appears to have cured Holmes of his idealism. Id. at 7. 
Eventually, he ceased to believe that anything was provable. According to Professor Rogat, “it is well known 
that he claimed to have difficulty even with the ‘truth’ of the sum of two and two.” Yosal Rogat & James M. 
O’Fallon, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion—The Speech Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1372 (1984). 
 28. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: JUSTICE HOLMES AND HIS FAMILY (1944). 
Bowen wrote “a flattering, fictionalized bestseller” based “on the personal reminiscences of relatives and law 
clerks,” reportedly because she was refused access to the Holmes papers by Harvard Law School. ALSCHULER, 
supra note 5, at 32. 
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and three decades more on the United States 
Supreme Court. During that time, he developed a judicial philosophy that called for courts 
to exercise great restraint in reversing the will of political majorities. As Professor White 
described it: 
To some extent courts were bound by the choices of their predecessors; it was not 
generally the province of judges to “undertake to renovate the law.” Even on those 
occasions when precedents gave no guidelines, a series of institutional constraints 
derived from Holmes’s notion of majoritarian sovereignty limited judicial freedom. 
The judiciary, not being elected representatives of the majority, was [not] to 
substitute its views for those of legislatures. The judiciary did not necessarily 
protect even constitutional rights against legislative infringement. All individual 
rights, for Holmes, were ultimately held at majority sufferance.29 
Holmes’s most famous articulation of this principle was his forceful dissent in 
Lochner v. New York, wherein he stated: “I think that the word ‘liberty,’ in the [Fourteenth] 
Amendment, is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant 
opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the 
statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by 
the traditions of our people and our law.”30 Holmes’s Lochner dissent was emblematic of 
his philosophy: “He has always been prone to sustain legislation where it was not clearly 
unconstitutional.”31 
Moreover, Holmes believed that a reviewing court was subject to an additional 
constraint, namely the findings of the trier of fact, and he exhibited such deference in a 
trilogy of First Amendment cases in the spring of 1919: Schenck v. United States,32 
Frohwerk v. United States,33 and Debs v. United States.34 These cases were brought by 
the Government under the Espionage Act of 1917 against individuals who spoke out 
against the participation of the United States in World War I. The Supreme Court 
unanimously affirmed convictions in all three cases. In Schenck, Holmes announced the 
“clear and present danger” test, which we have come to understand as a highly speech-
protective doctrine, but “it is hard to see how a clear and present danger test of any 
substance was there applied.”35 Indeed, “much of the language in Schenck is simply 
inconsistent with any satisfactory protection of speech.”36 Debs was equally problematic; 
it embodied “the dead opposite of any significant clear and present danger doctrine.”37 
Frohwerk, which relied on Schenck, involved the publication of a newspaper titled the 
Missouri Staats Zeitung. There was no indication that the paper’s editorials were directed 
                                                          
 29. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 
134 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION] (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law 
in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899)). 
 30. 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905). 
 31. WHITE, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, supra note 6, at 369 (quoting Charles E. Carpenter, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jurist, 8 ORE. L. REV. 269, 270 (1929)). 
 32. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 33. 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
 34. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
 35. Rogat & O’Fallon, supra note 27, at 1371. 
 36. Id. at 1370. 
 37. Id. at 1375. 
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to individuals involved in the war effort or to those who had been conscripted for service 
in the military (as was the case in Schenck). Thus, the evidence that the editorials presented 
a danger at all, much less a clear and present one, was scant. Nevertheless, Holmes 
affirmed the conviction in a passage that demonstrates the extreme deference he was 
willing to accord jury verdicts: 
But we must take the case on the record as it is, and on that record it is impossible 
to say that it might not have been found that the circulation of the paper was in 
quarters where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame and that the fact 
was known and relied upon by those who sent the paper out.38 
These three cases illustrate Holmes’s early insensitivity to free speech. While 
Holmes is widely celebrated today as the father of the modern First Amendment,39 he 
came to that view late in his career. Holmes treated the trilogy of speech cases decided in 
the spring of 1919 as nothing more than “routine criminal appeal[s].”40 While Schenck 
announced the “clear and present danger” test, Professor White notes that “Schenck, 
Frohwerk, and Debs, taken together, suggest that Holmes’ ‘clear and present danger’ test 
was simply a restatement of ‘attempts’ language found in his earlier opinions . . . [and] did 
not significantly modify his earlier free speech jurisprudence.”41 To much the same effect, 
Professor Thomas Healy has noted: “In short, Holmes was in many ways the justice least 
likely to stick his neck out for the right of free speech – and for the Court’s role in enforcing 
that right.”42 Holmes had not yet begun to use the First Amendment as a tool for protecting 
those who spoke out against the government. 
That evolution came in the following Term when he filed his justly celebrated 
dissent in Abrams v. United States.43 In Abrams, the Government prosecuted war 
protesters, this time under the Sedition Act of 1918, for tossing from the roof of a hat 
factory some 5000 leaflets calling for a general strike to protest U.S. operations in Russia. 
The Government claimed—and a jury found—that this was intended to impair the U.S. 
war effort against Germany. The Supreme Court affirmed, employing much the same 
reasoning that Holmes had employed in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs.44 Holmes 
dissented in sonorous language that set the terms for our modern interpretation of the First 
Amendment. And once he unlocked that door, Holmes stepped through it body and soul. 
As Professor White notes, “[i]n only one free speech case after Abrams did Holmes fail to 
                                                          
 38. Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 209. 
 39. See, e.g., THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 23, at xiii. 
 40. See Harry Kalven, Professor Ernst and Debs v. United States, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 238 (1973). 
Professor Kalven was there referring only to Debs but, as Professor Rogat points out, the same “was true of all 
these cases.” Rogat & O’Fallon, supra note 27, at 1378. 
 41. WHITE, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, supra note 6, at 420. Holmes’s insensitivity to free speech issues 
dates back to his days on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts where he famously said: “The petitioner 
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe 
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517–18 (1892). See also Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (1895) 
(upholding conviction for speaking on the Boston Commons on the theory that the state could limit speech at 
will in a public park it owns). 
 42. THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND – AND 
CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 6–7 (2013). 
 43. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). See HEALY, supra note 42, at 4–8. 
 44. Id. at 623 (“[T]he plain purpose of their propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of the war, 
disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they hoped, revolution, in this country.”). 
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adopt a position in support of speech rights.”45 
Much has been written about Holmes’s Abrams dissent and his subsequent pro-First 
Amendment jurisprudence.46 It will not be rehearsed here, as it is far beyond the scope of 
this Essay. What I do wish to consider are some of the reasons Holmes might have had for 
changing positions, as those reasons might bear directly on why Holmes chose to write as 
he did in Schwimmer.47 In his personal correspondence, Holmes repeatedly complains 
about letters protesting his opinion in Debs: “Just now I am receiving some singularly 
ignorant protests against a decision that I wrote sustaining a conviction of Debs, a labor 
agitator . . . .”48 And further, more testily: “I am beginning to get stupid letters of protest 
against a decision that Debs, a noted agitator, was rightly convicted . . . .”49 
There was also considerable academic criticism. Professor Ernst Freund wrote a 
sharply critical article in The New Republic,50 which Holmes took so seriously that he 
drafted (but never sent) a letter to Herbert Croly, editor of The New Republic, defending 
his opinion.51 Moreover, Holmes was the object of private criticism and pressure on 
account of Debs in particular. According to Professor Rogat, “[Zechariah] Chafee, . . . at 
a tea arranged by Harold Laski, may have convinced Holmes of the need for more stringent 
protection of speech. It may also be that Holmes was moved by finding among the ‘fools 
and knaves’ who took issue with Debs many of the young men whose friendship and 
respect he greatly valued.”52 
Respect and admiration were precisely what Holmes craved his entire career and, 
despite the many outward signs that he achieved it, he remained insecure and 
dissatisfied.53 In Holmes’s “Life Plan”: Confronting Ambition, Passion, and 
Powerlessness,54 Professor White refers to “Holmes’s ambivalent reception of his 
                                                          
 45. WHITE, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, supra note 6, at 445. The single subsequent case where Holmes did 
not come out on the side of free speech was Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920), where he concurred in 
the result without explanation. His disagreement with Brandeis’s free speech-protective dissent might thus have 
been procedural rather than substantive, namely, the application of the First Amendment to the states. See id. at 
336 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 46. See, e.g., RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE 
SPEECH (1987); GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 203–11 (2004). 
 47. Most commentators agree that Abrams and subsequent Holmes opinions cannot be reconciled with his 
earlier speech cases. But it does not appear that Holmes himself ever recognized he had changed his position. In 
his Abrams dissent Holmes insisted, “I never have seen any reason to doubt that the questions of law that alone 
were before this Court in the Cases of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs were rightly decided.” Abrams, 250 U.S. at 
627 (citations omitted). 
 48. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Apr. 5, 1919), in THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN 
LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS EINSTEIN 1903–1935, at 184 (James Bishop 
Peabody ed., 1964). 
 49. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 5, 1919), in HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: 
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874–1932, at 7–8 (Mark 
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941). 
 50. Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, May 13, 1919, at 13. 
 51. We know about the letter to Croly because Holmes enclosed the draft in a letter to Harold Laski with the 
comment that he thought Freund’s article “was poor stuff.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. 
Laski (May 13, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 24, at 202–04. 
 52. Rogat & O’Fallon, supra note 27, at 1378. 
 53. WHITE, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, supra note 6, at 369–71. See also id. at 476 (“Ambition also fostered 
Holmes’ singular competitiveness, his extreme sensitivity to criticism, his thirst for recognition, . . . and his 
insatiable desire for an even higher level of accomplishment.”). 
 54. 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1409 (1990) [hereinafter White, Holmes’s Life Plan]. 
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canonization.”55 This was based on Holmes’s grave concern that, with advancing age and 
eventual retirement and death, his reputation and the influence of his legal thinking would 
be lost and he would slide into obscurity. His friendships with younger intellectuals like 
Felix Frankfurter, Laski, and their contemporaries “made possible the channeling of his 
passion . . . toward the goals of a resurgent professional ambition. These goals precipitated 
judicial contributions that, thanks to the approval of his new friends, eventually secured 
Holmes the level of recognition to which he had always aspired.”56 
Nevertheless, Holmes continued to feel “apprehension . . . about his friendships with 
the younger generation of scholars.”57 Thus, in “one letter to Frankfurter, . . . Holmes 
noted his ‘rather fearful hope that I may never fall from the place you have given me,’ and 
‘my expectation that always while I live . . . I shall have great cause to be proud of having 
counted for something in your life.’”58 Holmes repeatedly expressed his ambition “to be 
admitted the greatest jurist in the world”59 and “the greatest legal thinker in the world.”60 
Given Holmes’s insecurity and lofty ambitions, significant pushback on his spring 1919 
speech opinions, from the very group of admirers that he was counting on to carry forward 
his legacy, might well have caused him to reconsider his position.61 
Finally, one must not underestimate the influence of Justice Louis Brandeis, the 
other brilliant mind on what was otherwise a mediocre Supreme Court. It was not merely 
that Brandeis courted and, presumably, flattered Holmes;62 the affinity of two superior 
intellects trapped in a small-group environment with arguably lesser intellects should not 
be understated. I find it significant that Brandeis joined Holmes’s three spring 1919 speech 
opinions, but they both did an about-face that fall in Abrams and worked pretty much in 
lock-step in speech cases thereafter. Professor Chafee posited the hypothesis that in the 
spring of 1919, Holmes “was biding his time until the Court should have before it a 
conviction so clearly wrong as to let him speak out his deepest thoughts about the First 
Amendment.”63 I find it more plausible that it was Brandeis who was biding his time: 
going along with Holmes in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs so as to gain his confidence, 
                                                          
 55. Id. at 1472. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. & n.336 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 9, 1915) (copy on 
file with Tulsa Law Review)). 
 59. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Canon Patrick Sheehan (Dec. 15, 1912), in HOLMES-SHEEHAN 
CORRESPONDENCE: LETTERS OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. AND CANON PATRICK AUGUSTINE 
SHEEHAN 78 (David H. Burton ed.,1976) [hereinafter HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE]. 
 60. White, Holmes’s Life Plan, supra note 54, at 1466 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Nina 
Gray (Dec. 2, 1910) (copy on file with Tulsa Law Review)). 
 61. See HEALY, supra note 42. 
 62. I have found no direct evidence that Brandeis flattered Holmes, but there is much flattery in Holmes’s 
correspondence with his regular correspondents, such as Frankfurter. See, e.g., Letter from Felix Frankfurter to 
Oliver Wendell Holmes (May 29, 1929), available at http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/4 
2879160/10. In this letter, Frankfurter congratulates Holmes on his Schwimmer dissent in extravagant terms: “I 
had assumed that you exhausted my capacity for being thrilled by magistral utterance on behalf of sanity in your 
Abrams opinion. But you have done it again and anew.” Biographer Liva Baker describes Laski’s side of the 
correspondence with Holmes as “a flattering and reverential one, every letter a genuflection.” BAKER, supra note 
6, at 488. One would surmise that Brandeis, like Frankfurter and Laski, detected Holmes’s affinity for such 
homage and played on it from time to time. 
 63. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 86 (1941). 
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then leveraging that trust to help turn the old warhorse around. There is little doubt that 
Brandeis eventually came to influence Holmes: Chief Justice Taft sourly complained that 
“Holmes was ‘so completely under the control’ of Brandeis that it gave Brandeis two votes 
instead of one.”64 Even if Taft was exaggerating, it is not difficult to imagine that a 
symbiotic affinity developed between these two great men so that they influenced each 
other to forge a bold new path in First Amendment law. 
Indeed, that affinity was on display in 1925, when Brandeis signed onto Holmes’s 
famous dissent in Gitlow v. New York.65 The Gitlow majority upheld a “criminal anarchy” 
conviction for publishing The Left Wing Manifesto in a radical newspaper named The 
Revolutionary Age. Holmes dissented, adopting a view of “incitement” that still resonates 
today: 
It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an incitement. Every 
idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless 
some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its 
birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement 
in the narrower sense is the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set 
fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us it 
had no chance of starting a present conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs 
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant 
forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be 
given their chance and have their way.66 
Holmes had rounded another jurisprudential corner in defense of free speech. He had again 
invited danger; he had again flirted with the idea of free speech experiments; and he had 
again asked us to place an almost blind faith in his free speech enterprise. In the process, 
he became bolder. But just how far would that boldness go? Did Gitlow mark the end of 
the experiment or was there something more that needed to be added to the jurisprudential 
mix? 
SCHWIMMER REDUX 
Holmes’s Abrams dissent brought him an avalanche of accolades from the 
intellectuals he admired, who then set in motion the process of canonization.67 In the 
acerbic words of a Holmes critic, “[h]is very name became laden, through processes not 
completely secular, with connotations of concern for liberty; only with the greatest 
difficulty could he from that time on be seen as merely a man.”68 His collaboration with 
Brandeis also continued and strengthened, and the two Justices broke new ground—often 
                                                          
 64. WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 29, at 135 (quoting 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE 
AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 969 (1939)). “Taft was determined to keep any prospective candidate 
who might join Holmes and Brandeis and side with that ‘dangerous twosome’ from being nominated.” PETER G. 
RENSTROM, THE TAFT COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 31 (2003). 
 65. 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 67. As Professor White notes, “Holmes’ ‘greatness’ was . . . the conscious product of a systematic campaign 
of publicity, a campaign in which Holmes participated.” WHITE, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, supra note 6, at 
355–56. 
 68. Rogat & O’Fallon, supra note 27, at 1389. 
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in dissents or concurrences—in a series of First Amendment cases. 
According to biographer Sheldon Novick, Brandeis urged Holmes to write dissents 
in a number of these cases, appealing to Holmes’s “sense of duty. . . . With each dissent 
he became more celebrated . . . .”69 One can speculate on the “accidents of history” that 
brought together these two men of different “temperaments . . . [and] philosophies.”70 
Brandeis, in full vigor of youth, was brilliant and methodical, yet lacked Holmes’s 
rhetorical power and reputation. While Holmes was near the end of his career, he could 
still turn a memorable phrase and come up with sweeping concepts that fired the 
imagination. It is not difficult to accept Novick’s claim that “Brandeis urged Holmes to 
write dissents, and Holmes did publish dissenting opinions more often than he would have 
. . . .”71 
There appears to be little doubt that Holmes wrote his Schwimmer dissent at 
Brandeis’s urging: 
[Mrs.] Holmes died on April 3, 1929, a few weeks after the oral arguments in 
Schwimmer. To help the grieving Holmes, then eighty-eight years old, Justice 
Brandeis spoke to his colleague about the Schwimmer case and about freedom of 
conscience. Talk of the case and the principle in it were therapeutic for the grieving 
jurist, or so Brandeis hoped. Thanks in part to Brandeis, Holmes rallied his energy 
and wrote a dissent.72 
As previously noted, writing the dissent posed some obstacles for Holmes because 
Schwimmer was an alien, and thus had no First Amendment rights, and because Holmes 
had to make findings on appeal, contradicting those of the district court. But these 
complications were beside the point because Holmes used his dissent to elucidate not so 
much a constitutional principle as a theory about the proper relationship between 
individuals and their government in a free society. With classic Holmesian terseness, he 
cut to the heart of the matter: “Surely it cannot show lack of attachment to the principles 
of the Constitution that she thinks that it can be improved. I suppose that most intelligent 
people think that it might be.”73 In other words, proposing changes in the way we govern 
ourselves is constructive and necessary, and any government that prohibits expressing 
such ideas is courting disaster by stifling the process that enables society to adapt to 
changing circumstances over time. 
Holmes takes pains to distance himself from Schwimmer’s ideas by stating that he 
does not share them.74 This is no doubt true, and it eliminates one possibility for his 
changed opinion—that he was simply favoring his own point of view. Holmes also points 
to groups like the Quakers who hold ideas similar to Schwimmer’s and “have done their 
share to make the country what it is” and states that he “had not supposed hitherto that we 
regretted our inability to expel them because they believed more than some of us do in the 
                                                          
 69. THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 23, at 320 (citing NOVICK, supra note 6, at 353). 
 70. WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 29, at 161. 
 71. THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 23, at 320 (citing NOVICK, supra note 6, at 476 n.36). 
 72. Id. at 338 (citing LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS: AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY OF ONE OF AMERICA’S TRULY 
GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 326 (1980)). 
 73. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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teachings of the Sermon on the Mount.”75 This rhetorical flare reminds readers that 
Schwimmer’s ideas are consistent with some understandings of the Christian faith, 
countering the notion that Schwimmer’s views are the product of her atheism. 
But Holmes then goes a step further and proclaims that there is one “principle of the 
Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other”: “the principle of 
free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought 
that we hate.”76 With this last idea, Holmes announces that there are limits on the power 
of government that transcend even those expressly imposed by the Constitution. He, who 
so memorably sneered at the idea of substantive due process in Lochner, foreshadowed 
the idea of unenumerated rights that the Supreme Court would recognize in a later era. 
And indeed, in Girouard v. United States,77 the Court overruled Schwimmer, citing 
Holmes’s dissent and using language that endorses his view: “The victory for freedom of 
thought recorded in our Bill of Rights recognizes that in the domain of conscience there is 
a moral power higher than the State.”78 The pre-Abrams Holmes might have cringed at 
this idea, but the Holmes of the Schwimmer dissent would surely have nodded agreement 
and perhaps even smiled. 
Holmes’s Schwimmer dissent has rightfully been criticized for being “devoid of any 
formal statutory analysis” (this was, after all, a case interpreting an immigration statute, 
not the Constitution) and for “substitut[ing] [Holmes’s] views about the respondent and 
her ideas about the war for any sustained examination for what power Congress had 
actually delegated to the Naturalization Board.”79 But such criticisms miss the point: 
Holmes was using Schwimmer’s case as a vehicle for explicating the concept he first 
posited in his Abrams dissent: “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas, . . . the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and . . . truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely 
can be carried out.”80 And, by applying it in a case where the speaker herself had no 
constitutional rights, Holmes may well have anticipated another important concept: The 
marketplace of ideas involves both speakers and listeners and denying Schwimmer her 
right to speak impaired the rights of others who might hear her ideas and benefit from 
them. The Supreme Court eventually recognized that principle in Kleindienst v. Mandel 81 
when it allowed U.S. citizens to challenge the refusal of a visa to a speaker whose message 
they wanted to hear.82 
                                                          
 75. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). In June 1929, in response to a letter from Laski praising his dissent, Holmes 
wrote, “I couldn’t help suspecting that [the majority opinion] was made easier by [Schwimmer’s] somewhat 
flamboyant declaration that she was an atheist.” THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 23, at 337. 
 76. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 654–55 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 77. 328 U.S. 61 (1946). 
 78. Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
 79. THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 23, at 339. 
 80. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 81. 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
 82. Although the Court ruled in favor of the government on the substantive claim, it considered the issue on 
the merits while recognizing that Mandel, the proposed speaker, “had no constitutional right of entry to this 
country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise.” Id. at 762. It thus decided the case on the basis of the right of the 
American petitioners to hear Mandel speak. Id. at 762; Id. at 775–76 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I am convinced 
that Americans cannot be denied the opportunity to hear Dr. Mandel’s views in person because their Government 
disapproves of his ideas.”). 
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More importantly, there is the story of Holmes’s ability to give birth to an idea, 
namely, that we should protect the very speech we abhor – speech that offends us, speech 
that aims to uproot the very principles we hold dear. Back then, the idea was bold, so much 
so that it was seen more as a rhetorical flourish than as a jurisprudential maxim. But, like 
so many other Holmesian ideas, in time it took root. Today, in case after case, it finds 
expression in our First Amendment literature, culminating in Justice Alito’s opinion in 
Matal v. Tam, which elevates it to “the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence.”83 
Offensive speech, hate speech, even lies have long received First Amendment 
protection.84 But with the Matal ruling, the toleration principle became our “proudest 
boast.” 
Think of it: In less than 700 words, in his waning years as a Supreme Court Justice, 
at an age where most men were long retired, writing in dissent, Holmes managed to give 
birth to an idea that the Court eventually parades as an accepted principle—one to boast 
about. And perhaps this was his purpose. As Professor White has noted, “Holmes believed 
that when he left the Court he would surrender not only the power to work but the power 
of place; that he would then be subject to the vicissitudes of fame or obscurity; that others 
would determine his fate.”85 Or, as Holmes himself put it in a radio address on the occasion 
of his ninetieth birthday: 
The riders in a race do not stop short when they reach the goal. There is a little 
finishing canter before coming to a standstill. There is time to hear the kind voice 
of friends and to say to one’s self: The work is done. But just as one says that, the 
answer comes: The race is over, but the work is never done while the power to work 
remains. The canter that brings you to a stand still need not be only coming to rest. 
It cannot be, while you still live. For to live is to function. That is all there is in 
living.86 
Holmes’s Schwimmer dissent may have been his way of overcoming his wife’s death by, 
himself, continuing to strive, to create, to live.87 
                                                          
 83. 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017). 
 84. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 403 
(1992) (White, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 711 (2012). 
 85. White, Holmes’s Life Plan, supra note 54, at 1474 (emphasis added). 
 86. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Radio Address to the Nation (Mar. 8, 1931), reproduced in THE FUNDAMENTAL 
HOLMES, supra note 23, at 342–43. 
 87. Fanny Holmes’s death no doubt reminded Holmes of his own mortality. He said as much in his May 30, 
1929 letter to Laski: “My wife’s death seems like the beginning of my own.” 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra 
note 24, at 1152. Holmes’s drive to “work . . . while the power to work remains” seems to have remained steady, 
if not increase, after her death. The day his wife died, in fact, Holmes wrote an opinion and sent it to Chief Justice 
Taft. See G. EDWARD WHITE, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 124 (2006). In the aforementioned letter to Laski, 
one month after her death, Holmes said, “My wife’s death . . . hasn’t prevented my writing. . . . I have just turned 
off a dissent about the refusal to admit a pacifist to citizenship that Brandeis liked and joined in. There seems to 
be a distinct compartment in one’s mind that works away no matter what is going on with the rest of the 
machinery.” 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 24, at 1152. Holmes’s secretary, Chapman Rose, said of 
October Term 1931: “[His] attention span had gone without depriving him of the drive that he always had to 
finish any unfinished business. So it was getting more difficult to prevent him from really exhausting himself.” 
WHITE, supra, at 125. Knowing that, to Holmes, living means functioning, it is unsurprising (and perhaps even 
characteristic) that Holmes would not only function—write the dissent—but that he would function grandly—
write a dissent that is impactful decades later and that becomes our proudest boast. 
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EPILOGUE 
Justice Holmes received a good dollop of praise for his Schwimmer dissent.88 In a 
letter to Laski in August 1929, Holmes reports: “I still get letters from lonely enthusiasts 
who shout over my dissent in the case of a dame who was not allowed to become a citizen 
because she was a pacifist.”89 In a typically curmudgeonly fashion, Holmes adds: “I told 
one of them that it was moral sympathy not legal judgment that led to his encomiums.”90 
Despite his protestations, Holmes no doubt enjoyed his fan mail immensely. One can 
imagine no worse fate for Holmes than descending into obscurity. 
Among his letter writers was Rosika Schwimmer herself. On January 28, 1930, she 
sent a two-page handwritten letter thanking Holmes for giving her hope, despite the 
unhappy outcome in her case. She stated that she had been advised, “You don’t thank 
judges,” but felt she had to write because she “carried [her] unexpressed gratitude as a 
moral debt.”91 Holmes responded in a letter dated just two days later. He first chastises 
her for writing to thank him and explains that “[a] case is simply a problem to be solved, 
although the considerations are more complex than those of mathematics.”92 However, he 
finishes on a warm note: “After which protestation, I must add that of course I am gratified 
by your more than kind expression, and that I thank you.”93 There ensued a 
correspondence between them that lasted, as best the record reflects, until 1934, the year 
before Holmes’s death. 
Because only two letters from Holmes and three letters and a telegram from 
Schwimmer appear to have survived,94 it is difficult to tell the nature of their 
correspondence. Schwimmer seems to have written Holmes on various occasions, such as 
his birthday and retirement from the Court, but there are no known responses from Holmes. 
He did write a second letter to Schwimmer, acknowledging a gift of books and expressing 
delight: 
I become a child again on reading them and sentimental tears drop from my eyes 
as I follow the boy chasing the rainbow or the youth of the other boys who followed 
the rainbow music. The law also is a rainbow, but to older eyes, and you have made 
                                                          
 88. For example, noted New York lawyer (and later Congressman) Frederic R. Coudert wrote to Holmes: 
“The result in such cases as that of Madam Schwimmer inclines one to pessimism . . . , but utterances such as 
your dissent in that case may save liberalism from becoming completely obsolete, and ultra-nationalism and other 
forms of fanatical conformity from becoming wholly dominant.” Letter from Frederic R. Coudert to Oliver 
Wendell Holmes (June 20, 1929), available at https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:36699707$56.i. 
 89. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Aug. 23, 1929), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, 
supra note 24, at 1177. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Letter from Rosika Schwimmer to Oliver Wendell Holmes 2 (Jan. 28, 1930), available at 
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:37509894$7i. 
 92. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Rosika Schwimmer (Jan. 30, 1930), available at 
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:43026636$2i. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Letter from Mark DeWolfe Howe to Edith Wynner (Oct. 3, 1955), available at 
http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/43026636/8 (explaining that “Holmes made it his 
general practice to destroy his incoming mail” and therefore the only letters available were the two from Holmes 
and the three from Schwimmer, plus a telegram). See also Letter from Mark DeWolfe Howe to Edith Wynner 
(Oct. 11, 1955), available at http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/43026636/6 (refusing 
Wynner access to search for further letters). I have, myself, been able to locate no others. 
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me forget it.95 
Many of Holmes’s commentators and biographers have alluded to his detached, 
almost cold, personality. In Professor White’s words: “[H]e gave so little of himself to the 
persons around him.”96 And, as Holmes explained in his letter to Schwimmer, he viewed 
cases as problems to be solved, without regard to the litigants whose lives would be 
dramatically impacted by his decision. But did this detached attitude hold true in 
Schwimmer’s case? As noted, Mrs. Holmes died after the case was argued and while 
Holmes was contemplating whether to dissent. There is little doubt that the loss of his wife 
hit Holmes hard; she was the one remaining person in his life to whom he showed warmth 
and devotion. In a 1910 letter to Canon Patrick Sheehan he waxed lyrical: “[M]y wife has 
made my whole life a path of beauty. She . . . has devoted all her powers to surrounding 
me with enchantments.”97 After her death, Holmes made regular visits to her grave at 
Arlington National Cemetery, “[u]sually a single flower, a rose, a spray of honeysuckle or 
perhaps a glowing poppy . . . in his hand.”98 
Did Holmes’s grief over the loss of his wife—a personal loss and a pointed reminder 
of his own mortality—soften him? Perhaps. But as his Abrams and Gitlow dissents reveal, 
he had already begun his tilt toward a free-speech-friendly mindset, one that found its final 
expression in his Schwimmer dissent. 
One wonders whether among his reasons for writing the Schwimmer dissent might 
have been to send a ray of hope and solace to the immigrant he knew would be devastated 
when she learned that she was rejected by her chosen country. There are hints in Holmes’s 
dissent that this may have been the case. He refers to her as “a woman of superior character 
and intelligence, obviously more than ordinarily desirable as a citizen of the United 
States.”99 He called her an “optimist” and “sincere” and referred to her testimony as 
making “a better argument for her admission than any that I can offer.”100 Perhaps he was 
sending Rosika Schwimmer a message: “Don’t despair, Madam. I, the greatest legal 
thinker in the world, consider you worthy of being my fellow citizen!” 
Again, perhaps. If so, then Justice Holmes had, indeed, traveled very far from the 
detached cynic that he prided himself on being for most of his long judicial career. It could 
be that, for a brief moment, he descended from Olympus. 
 
                                                          
 95. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Rosika Schwimmer (Feb. 5, 1939), available at 
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:43026636$4i. 
 96. WHITE, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, supra note 6, at 411. See also ALSCHULER, supra note 5, at 31–37 
(gathering sources). 
 97. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Canon Patrick Sheehan (Aug. 14, 1910), in HOLMES-SHEEHAN 
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 59, at 32. 
 98. THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 23, at 345 (quoting The Poe Sisters, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 
1935, at A12). 
 99. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. at 654 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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